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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
V. 
Case No. 20051115-SC 
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE, : 20040877-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner Gerald Steven Wallace, through counsel, hereby replies to the Brief of 
Respondent (May 10, 2006). Point I addresses newly raised arguments that Utah law 
authorizes single probation terms longer than thirty-six months. Point II addresses new 
arguments that Utah law authorizes consecutive terms of probation. 
POINT I: UTAH LAW LIMITS PROBATION TO THIRTY SIX 
MONTHS. 
A. Utah Misconstrues Mr. Wallace's Interpretation of Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). 
The state incorrectly characterizes Mr. Wallace's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). Br. Resp. at 11. Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) declares: 
Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class 
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
According to the state, Mr. Wallace denies that the first clause of section 77-18-
1(10)(a)(i) is permissive despite the presence of "may." Br. Resp. at 11. 
To the contrary, Mr. Wallace acknowledges that "may," as used in the first clause 
preceding "or," is permissive. Prior to the completion of thirty-six months probation, a 
court may - or may not - terminate said probation. However, the permissive "may" does 
not condition the second clause beginning with the disjunction "or." Use of the 
disjunction "or" signals that the clauses it separates stand as wholly discrete options or 
choices. Br. Pet. at 8-10 (and cases cited therein). 
B. This Court Interpreted Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) as Limiting Probation to 
Thirty-Six Months in State v. Call 
This Court, in State v. Call, acknowledged that the current version of section 77-
18-l(10)(a)(l) limits probation to thirty-six months. 1999 UT 42, K 11, 980 P.2d 201. 
The significance of Call should not be minimized. Compare Br. Resp. at 18. 
In Call, the defendant's argument, in fact, was premised upon the thirty-six month 
limit imposed by section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). He spent no fewer than five pages of his 
opening brief establishing that probation ends as a matter of law at thirty-six months. 
(Pages 10-16 of the Brief of Appellant, Case No. 890047 are attached as Addendum A.1) 
The Court acknowledged the defendant's assertion: "Call contends that '[p]ursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996), felony probation terminates by [operation of] 
law after 36 months " Call, 1999 UT 42, ^ 8 (alteration in original). The state's brief 
1
 The Call appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals under Case No. 97003 9-CA. On or 
about January 21, 1998, the appeal was certified to the Utah Supreme Court and assigned 
Case No. 980047. The Court may take judicial notice of the briefs filed in State v. Call, 
because their content is not subject to dispute. Utah R. Evid. 201 (2006). 
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in Call, at 18, concedes, "Unless earlier terminated or extended, felony probation ends by 
law after 36 months." Consequently, the Court recognized that section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
imposes a thirty-six-month limit on probation: Defendant's agreement to extend 
probation confinned his knowledge that "probation would not expire at the conclusion of 
the statutory 36-month period." Call, 1999 UT 42, ^ 11 
That the Court reached this interpretation of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) without 
explanation should not be construed as a hasty conclusion void of analysis. The 
conclusion was reached with the benefit of the defendant's argument, the state's 
concession, and the clear language of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). A conclusion so 
compelled requires little explanation. 
POINT II: UTAH LAW DOES NOT AUTHORIZE CONSECUTIVE 
TERMS OF PROBATION. 
A. Concerns that Section 77-18-l(10)(a)(D Imposes an "Absolute Cap of 
Thirty-Six Months" on Probation Are Unwarranted. 
Mr. Wallace asserts that section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) places "an absolute cap of 
thirty-six months on probation. . . ." Br. Resp. at 21. From this, the state worries that a 
person sentenced to five consecutive five-years-to-life terms of imprisonment might 
receive but thirty-six months probation from a "lenient court." Id. Such concern is 
unwarranted. 
Probation should never be imposed upon a suspended sentence without 
considering public safety and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See McPhie v. 
Turner, 351 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah 1960) (quoting Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554, 557 
(Utah 1959)). The legislature has imposed numerous procedural safeguards to ensure 
3 
probation is only granted in appropriate circumstances. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(5) (Supp. 2005). The legislature has identified probation supervision requirements 
expressly reflecting concerns for "public safety." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(3)(a)(iv). 
The legislature has also provided for an extension of the thirty-six-month maximum upon 
proof that the defendant has violated probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii). 
Finally, even if Utah law authorized consecutive probation terms, that same "lenient 
court" might still order only thirty-six months of probation for the hypothetical offender 
described above. If this constitutes unwise public policy, it is the legislature's charge to 
correct it, not the Court's. 
B. The State's Reliance upon section 77-18-l(2)(a) is misplaced. 
The plain language of section 77-18-l(2)(a) does not authorize imposition of 
consecutive probation terms. Compare Br. Resp. at 23. Rather, section 77-18-l(2)(a) is 
relevant to the issue of consecutive probation terms because it so clearly distinguishes 
"sentence" from "probation." With that distinction established, so is the futility of Utah's 
attempt to expand section 76-3-401 to include probation as a "sentence" a court may 
order to run consecutively. 
C. Mr. Wallace Was Not Provided a Choice between Probation and 
Incarceration at the Sentence Hearing. 
The erroneous assertion that Mr. Wallace was free to reject probation in favor of 
incarceration cannot cure the violation of Mr. Wallace's due process rights. Compare Br. 
Resp. at 24 (citing Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, U 19, 124 P.3d 259). Whether Mr. 
Wallace chose to serve an illegal probation term is not relevant to either issue identified 
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for certiorari review. Even so, Sections 1 and 2, below, establish that neither Utah law 
nor the facts of this case support the state's assertion. 
1, No choice exists as a matter of law. 
Where the legislature empowers a court to impose sentence or sentencing 
alternatives, probation is "'not part of a quasi-contract wherein the court offers something 
which the defendant is free to accept or reject '" Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 189 
(Wyo. 1990) (quoting State v. Lynch, 394 N.W. 2d 651, 662 (Neb. 1986)); accord State v. 
Walton, 738 N.E.2d 1258, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (where statute authorizes the court 
to suspend a sentence and impose probation, and where an offender may appeal any such 
decision, "an offender has no right to refuse probation"). 
In addition to deferring to the legislature's authority to define sentencing options, 
leaving the final choice to the court simply makes sense: 
It is the district court, not the defendant, who is given the task of 
determining the sentence for a crime. . . . This scheme makes eminent sense 
when one recalls that a defendant is normally quite biased regarding the 
manner in which he or she should be sentenced. 
United States v. Thomas, 934 F.2d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 1991). 
In fact, situations exist in which a court properly rejects a defendant's objection to 
probation. Thomas, 934 R2d at 844 n.10. For example, an offender convicted of illegal 
drug use might object to regular blood testing. A court, however, may properly conclude 
that such a condition furthers legitimate interests in public safety, rehabilitation and 
deterrence. Id. (quoting N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The Law of Probation and Parole, § 5.07 
at 204 (1983 & Supp. 1990)). See also State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1991) ("The granting or withholding of probation involves considering intangibles 
of character, personality and attitude.... These matters ... are of such nature that the 
problem of probation must of necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who hears 
the case"). 
Allowing the defendant to choose incarceration over probation would empower 
the defendant to override the trial court's sentencing authority, and no Utah statute does 
that. Sections 76-3-201(2), 77-18-l(2)(a), and 77-27-2(10) address imposition of 
probation upon suspension of a sentence. Just as none of these empowers a defendant to 
reject incarceration in favor of a sentencing alternative, none empowers a defendant to 
prevent a trial court from suspending a sentence and imposing probation at the sentence 
hearing. Given that a defendant in Utah may challenge on appeal those probation terms 
he or she contends constitute an abuse of discretion, there exists no statutorily implied 
right to reject probation at the sentencing hearing. 
Of course, a defendant is not powerless to influence decisions made at a sentence 
hearing. Lynch, 394 N.W.2d at 662 ("it is nonetheless entirely proper for a judge to base 
his or her rejection of probation as a sentencing alternative upon a defendant's 
presentence statements") (citing State v. Kinney, 350 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 1984)). For 
example, the convicted drug user mentioned above may need inpatient substance abuse 
treatment. If the defendant completely rejects any such treatment need, the sentencing 
court must enjoy the discretion to determine whether probation or incarceration will best 
serve the public's and the defendant's respective interests. This does not, however, mean 
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the defendant is legally empowered to prevent the trial court from imposing probation or 
any other post-conviction alternative authorized by the legislature. 
Only after probation is imposed at the sentencing hearing does a defendant in 
Utah have a choice: either obey the terms imposed or suffer the consequences. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)-(12) (Supp. 2005). Even if probation were analogous to a 
contract to which a defendant may accede, a refusal to sign the written agreement 
defining the terms of probation, which occurs after issuance of the sentencing order, may 
be viewed as a violation of probation already imposed, not a choice that restricts the trial 
court's statutory authority at the sentence hearing to impose sentence or an alternative 
thereto. See State v. Ruesga, 851 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The state and the Court of Appeals cite State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d 1119, 
1121 (Utah 1977) to support the contention that probation is a choice. Br. Resp. at 24 
(citing Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <[f 19). Other Utah appellate decisions have echoed 
the probation-is-a-choice mantra without citing legal precedent. E.g., Ruesga, 851 P.2d 
at 1231 n.2 ("The defendant is free to accept the court's offer to spend time under 
probation or to decline the court's good grace and spend the entire sentence in prison"). 
See also Thomas, 934 F.2d at 844 & n.9 (discussing cases that recognize a defendant's 
right to reject probation in which the proposition is either dictum or proffered without 
analysis). Allmendinger, however, not only undermines the probation-is-a-choice theory, 
but it also was decided without proper appellate jurisdiction. 
In Allmendinger, the defendant pleaded guilty to a crime that carried a maximum 
six-month term of incarceration. The trial court suspended the sentence and imposed one 
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year of probation. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1120. Some nine months into the one-year 
term, the defendant was ordered to appear and show cause why probation should not be 
revoked. The defendant moved to dismiss the OSC for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that 
probation could not last longer than the six-month maximum term of incarceration. The 
trial court denied the motion to dismiss the OSC and the defendant appealed. Id. 
Utah law in 1977 provided that a court "'may place the defendant on probation for 
such period of time as the court shall determine."5 Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
17 (1953 as amended)). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005) 
(imposing a thirty-six-month limit). The Court decided that, "[i]n the absence of any 
express limitations," the trial court could require that the defendant serve probation 
longer than the maximum term of incarceration. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1121. In 
effect, the Court merely recognized a trial court's authority to impose probation terms 
that are not otherwise expressly restricted by law. 
Since Allmendinger, the legislature imposed an "express limitation" to the length 
of probation absent violation thereof: thirty-six months, pursuant to section 77-18-
l(10)(a)(i). Allmendinger does not empower a court to force a choice between illegal 
terms of probation and incarceration. 
Most significantly, Allmendinger was decided in excess of the Court's authority. 
A denied motion to dismiss an OSC is not a final appealable order. Unless excepted by 
conditions irrelevant to the status of Allmendinger, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
a non-final order. Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, If 11, 37 P.3d 
1070. The Allmendinger Court conceded that a refusal to dismiss an OSC was not a final 
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appealable order, but concluded that, so long as it merely affirmed the trial court's 
refusal, no harm would result: 
This appeal is from an order denying appellant's motion to dismiss an order 
to show cause for lack of jurisdiction. This is not an appealable order but 
since no objection is made thereto, there is no objection to considering the 
matter if the ruling of the trial court is affirmed. 
Allmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1121. By the Court's own admission, the opinion in 
Allmendinger was rendered without jurisdiction to do so. 
2. Mr. Wallace possessed no choice as a matter of fact 
Any choice Mr. Wallace might have enjoyed to influence the court's sentencing 
decision was illusory as a matter of fact. The trial court was unwavering in its intent to 
impose probation so that it could require Mr. Wallace to pay restitution. There was no 
choice: 
The Court: Mr. Wallace is not going to jail. 
The Court: Restitution, we're going to have a long discussion about that. 
The Court: Mr. Wallace isn't going to jail, Mr. Wallace is going to pay 
restitution if he's responsible for restitution. That's really not optional 
The Court: It will be part of the order in this case. Part of the condition for 
probation will be restitution and I understand given the amount, we're going 
to have to talk about it and work it out but there is going to be a restitution 
requirement. I want to hear from the State first, 
[To the prosecuting attorney] Mr. [sic] Barlow, if you want to 
address the issue of jail you can but you're going to be whistling in the wind. 
(R. 415 at 4-5 (emphasis added); the entire sentencing transcript is attached to the Brief of 
Petitioner as Addendum H.) 
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Whether or not Mr. Wallace was legally empowered to rob the trial court of 
authority to suspend a sentence and impose probation, no such choice was offered. Mr. 
Wallace did not voluntarily and knowingly "choose" to accept an illegal term of 
probation. That Mr. Wallace timely appealed the imposition of 144 months probation is 
further evidence that no such choice occurred. 
Finally, a defendant may challenge an illegal sentence "at any time." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e) (2006). The doctrine of invited error does not qualify the "any time" 
provision of Rule 22(e) absent clear evidence that such an invitation actually occurred. 
E.g., State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, ^ 13, 59 P.3d 604 ("the colloquy between the 
trial court and Defendant's counsel lacked sufficient clarity to construe it as an invitation 
or stipulation for the trial court to violate [the statute at issue]"), affd 2004 UT 79. In this 
case, the evidence belies any claim that Mr. Wallace invited an illegal term of probation. 
(R. 415 at 4-5, 11-12.) Again, his timely appeal constitutes further evidence that he did 
not seek a 144-month probation term. 
D. If Probation Is a "Sentence" Subject to Section 76-3-401, Allowing 
Consecutive Probation Terms May Violate Double Jeopardy Protections. 
The state suggests two reasons why construing probation as a sentence would not 
threaten violation of double jeopardy protections. Br. Resp. at 23-24. Each is unavailing. 
2
 If indeed a statute empowered Mr. Wallace to rob the court of authority to impose 
probation, that statute creates an interest subject to constitutional due process protections. 
See State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, ^ 12, 976 P.2d 1224. Any waiver of rights 
conferred by that statute, and thus the right to due process, must be knowing and 
voluntary. Id. 
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First, unlike the defendant in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), a 
Utah defendant who receives probation upon a suspended sentence is statutorily assured a 
term of no longer than thirty-six months by section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). In DiFrancesco, 
the defendant challenged the government's statutory right to challenge on appeal the 
imposition of probation in favor of incarceration. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 122-23. By a 
five-to-four margin, the majority upheld the government's right to seek review, and held 
that revocation of probation and re-imposition of a sentence does not violate double 
jeopardy protections. Id. at 137. In dicta, the majority observed that there are many 
situations in which sentencing statutes do not guarantee a sentence's limit. Id. 
Here, by contrast, the issue involves the extension of probation beyond thirty-six 
months for violating probation terms which themselves may not constitute criminal 
activity. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (authorizing potential terms of probation, such as 
obtaining a GED, which themselves do not involve criminal conduct); § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) 
(thirty-six-month limit on probation); § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii) (probation length may be 
lengthened upon proof of a probation violation). Where there exists a legitimate 
expectation in a sentence's finality, an extension of that sentence does violate the double 
jeopardy clause. Compare DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139. If probation is a "sentence," 
rather than a sentencing alternative imposed upon a sentence's suspension, then forcing a 
defendant to serve more time than the legislatively decreed limit based upon no/i-criminal 
activity constitutes an additional sentence based upon the original conviction. 
Second, the state itself argues in another case that probation is not a "sentence" 
subject be being run consecutively pursuant to section 76-3-401. State v. Anderson, Case 
n 
No. 20041095-CA. Section 76-3-401(1 )(b) authorizes a court to run a later imposed 
sentence consecutively to one already being served: 
(1) . . . . The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already 
serving. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(l)(b) (2003). 
In Anderson, the defendant was convicted of a single crime, for which the court 
(the "first court") sentenced him to prison, suspended that sentence, and imposed 
probation. While on probation, the defendant committed three additional crimes. The 
court with sentencing jurisdiction for the additional crimes (the "second court") sentenced 
the defendant to three tennis of imprisonment to run concurrently. Anderson, Br. Aplee. 
at 2-3. Only then did the first court revoke probation and re-impose the original, 
suspended sentence. The first court, however, ordered the re-imposed original sentence to 
run consecutively to the sentence imposed by the second court for the additional 
convictions. Id. 
The defendant in Anderson argued that while the second court was statutorily 
authorized to run the later sentences consecutively to the one already being served, the 
first court was not. Id. at 10-11. In response, the state declared that the second court 
could not have imposed its sentence either concurrently or consecutively to the one 
already being served because, at the time the second court entered its sentence, the 
12 
defendant was only on probation for the prior conviction - and probation does not 
constitute a sentence subject to section 76-3-401(l)(b): 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) lets the sentencing judge order concurrent or 
consecutive sentencing only with "other sentences the defendant is already 
serving." Defendant was not serving time for his [original sentence], so [the 
second court] could not order his [later] sentences to run concurrent with his 
[original sentence]. 
Anderson, Br. Aplee. at 11. The state's argument in Anderson makes sense only if 
probation is not a "sentence." If probation is a sentence, the second court most certainly 
could have exercised its discretion pursuant to section 76-3-401(1 )(b). 
In Anderson, therefore, the state supports Mr. Wallace's position herein that 
probation is not a "sentence" subject to the terms of section 76-3-401.3 Pages 2-3, 10-11 
from the Brief of Appellee in Anderson are attached hereto as Addendum B (see supra, 
n.l). 
CONCLUSION 
The plain language of section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) limits a term of probation to thirty-
six months for felonies. Likewise clear is legislative intent to prohibit imposition of 
consecutive probation terms. 
Mr. Wallace's 144-month probation term is invalid because it exceeds the thirty-
six-month limitation for felonies. If this Court decides the legislature authorized 
imposition of consecutive terms of probation, Mr. Wallace's 144-month term must still be 
3
 See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997) (it is fundamentally 
unfair for the state to assert "flip flopping theories" because doing so "reduces[s] criminal 
trials to mere gamesmanship and rob[s] them of their supposed search for truth" (quoting 
Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1479 (11th Circ. 1985) (en banc) (Clark, J. concurring))), 
rev'don other grounds 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
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vacated and a thirty-six-month term imposed in its place because the trial court provided 
no clear indication of its intent to impose consecutive terms of probation. 
0t 
DATED this / _ day of June, 2006. 
THE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
'' 7 
i 
~- I John Pace 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Certificate of Delivery 
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DELIVERED to the Utah Supreme Court and to the Office of the Utah Attorney General 
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jhL 
15 
ADDENDUM A 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN VIOLATING CALL'S PROBATION AND 
SENTENCING HIM TO PRISON WHERE THE PROBATION 
PERIOD HAD PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED. 
A. FELONY PROBATION TERMINATES BY OPERATION OF 
LAW IF NO ACTION IS TAKEN IN COURT BEFORE 
EXPIRATION OF THE 36-MONTH PROBATION TERM. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996), 
probation for a felony terminates as a matter of law after three 
years unless the trial court acts to extend the probation period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996) states in pertinent part: 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at 
any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of 3 6 
months of probation in felony cases or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in 
cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration 
or termination of the probation period, owes 
outstanding fines, restitution, or other 
assessed costs, the court may retain 
jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited 
purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and 
other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court 
may require the defendant to show cause why 
his failure to pay should not be treated as 
contempt of court or why the suspended jail 
or prison term should not be imposed, 
(b) The department shall notify the 
sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in 
writing in advance in all cases when termination 
of supervised probation will occur by law. The 
notification shall include a probation progress 
report and complete report of details on 
outstanding fines, restitution, and other amounts 
outstanding. 
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(11) (b) The running of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of 
an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or 
extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a 
finding in court that the probationer has 
violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked 
except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been 
violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit 
alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of 
probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of 
probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is 
probable cause, it shall cause to be served 
on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or 
a copy of the affidavit and an order to show 
cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall 
specify a time and place for the hearing and 
shall be served upon the defendant at least 
five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good 
cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall 
inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to 
have counsel appointed for him if he is 
indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the 
defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant 
shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the 
allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence 
on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given 
adverse information on which the allegations 
are based shall be presented as witnesses 
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s u b j e c t t o q u e s t i o n i n g by the d e f e n d a n t 
u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f o r good cause o t h e r w i s e 
o r d e r s . 
( iv ) The d e f e n d a n t may c a l l w i t n e s s e s , 
a p p e a r and s p e a k i n h i s own b e h a l f , a n d 
p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e . 
(e) ( i ) A f t e r t h e hea r ing t h e c o u r t s h a l l 
make f i n d i n g s of f a c t . 
( i i ) Upon a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t 
v i o l a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p r o b a t i o n , t h e 
c o u r t may o r d e r t h e p r o b a t i o n r e v o k e d , 
m o d i f i e d , c o n t i n u e d , o r t h a t t h e e n t i r e 
p r o b a t i o n t e r m commence anew. 
( i i i ) I f p r o b a t i o n i s r e v o k e d , t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be sen tenced o r t h e s e n t e n c e 
p r e v i o u s l y imposed s h a l l be e x e c u t e d . 
(emphasis added) ; s e e Addendum C c o n t a i n i n g e n t i r e t e x t of 
s t a t u t e . 
In S t a t e v . G r e e n , 757 P .2d 462 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) , t h e U tah 
Supreme Court h e l d t h a t u n d e r t h e v e r s i o n of S e c t i o n 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 t h e n 
i n e f f e c t , p r o b a t i o n a u t o m a t i c a l l y t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e end of t h e 
p r o b a t i o n p e r i o d and t h e t r i a l judge l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e 
c a s e when p r o b a t i o n t e r m i n a t e d u n l e s s r e v o c a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s were 
p r o p e r l y i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y t e r m . G r e e n , 757 P . 2d 
a t 465 . In Green, AP&P f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t of p r o b a t i o n v i o l a t i o n 
i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t a f t e r t h e p r o b a t i o n p e r i o d h a d p a s s e d . The 
a f f i d a v i t c l a imed t h a t Green had v i o l a t e d h i s p r o b a t i o n b a s e d on 
c r i m e s which a l l e g e d l y o c c u r r e d du r ing t h e p r o b a t i o n p e r i o d . The 
Cour t conc luded t h a t e v e n t h o u g h t h e v i o l a t i o n o c c u r r e d d u r i n g 
t h e p r o b a t i o n p e r i o d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d id no t h a v e t h e power t o 
r e v o k e G r e e n ' s p r o b a t i o n b e c a u s e t h a t p r o b a t i o n h a d t e r m i n a t e d by 
o p e r a t i o n of law p r i o r t o p r o p e r commencement of r e v o c a t i o n 
p r o c e e d i n g s . Green, 757 P. 2d a t 463. See a l s o S m i t h v . Cook, 
803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) ( r e v o c a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s must b e p r o p e r l y 
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initiated prior to termination of probation period); State v. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995) (extension proceedings 
must be properly commenced prior to termination of probation 
period). 
The version of Section 77-18-1(10) (a) which applied in 
Green stated: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, 
or six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the 
offender shall be terminated from sentence and 
the supervision of the Division of Corrections, 
unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court. 
Green, 757 P. 2d at 464 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 
1984) ) . 
While the version of § 77-18-1 applied in Green expressly 
stated that probation terminated at the end of the probation 
period, the current version of the statute similarly provides for 
termination by operation of law at the end of the probation 
period. See State v. Reedy, Case No. 950638-CA (Utah App. April 
17, 1997) (assuming probation period automatically terminates 
under version of statute then in effect). Section 10(a) (i) 
provides that " [p]robation may be terminated at anytime or at the 
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 
36 months of probation in felony cases." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). While Section 10(a)(i) 
does not contain the "shall be terminated" language of the Green 
version of the statute, it nevertheless provides a maximum 
probationary term. Section 10(a)(ii) refers to "expiration or 
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termination of the probation period." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(Supp. 1996) The "probation period" which can expire or 
terminate is the period of 36 months as outlined in Section 
10(a) (i) . 
Section 10 (b) requires AP&P to notify the court and 
prosecutor "when termination of supervised probation will occur 
by law." Section 10(b) contemplates that probation will 
terminate by operation of law at the end of the probation period, 
just as it did under the Green version of the statute. Section 
11(b) provides for the tolling of the probation period only "upon 
the filing of a violation report with the court. . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Supp. 1996). This section further 
demonstrates that the statute anticipates that the probation 
period terminates by operation of law unless the proper 
procedural steps are taken prior to the termination date. 
Sections 10(a) (i) and (ii) , 10(b) and 11(b), when read 
together, demonstrate the legislative intent that the probation 
terminate by operation of law at the end of the probation period. 
See generally State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987) 
(quoting Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 1965) ("one of 
fundamental rules of statutory construction that the statute 
should be looked at as a whole and in light of the general 
purpose it was intended to serve")). Additionally, unless the 
statute is interpreted to include automatic termination at the 
end of the probation period, defendants would be subjected to the 
"absurd results" of being "left in a perpetual state of limbo" 
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which were rejected in Green. See Green, 757 P. 2d at 464. 
Although defendants such as Call would be placed on 3 6 months 
probation, unless such period automatically terminates, such 
defendants would remain "subject to a continued term of fictional 
supervision," "although their probation would appear to have been 
terminated." Green, 757 P. 2d at 464. 
The judgment in this case states that Call was placed on 
probation for three years. R. 44-46. Pursuant to the terms of 
the judgment, Call's probation terminated as of April 3, 1995. 
R. 44-46. See generally Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d at 793 (court 
agrees with inmate's claim that pursuant to "the express terms of 
his probation order, his probation terminated prior to the time 
revocation proceedings were initiated"). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996) and the 
express terms of the judgment, Call's probation terminated three 
years after his April 3, 1992 sentencing date unless probation 
extension or revocation proceedings were properly commenced prior 
to April 3, 1995.2 In this case, probation extension 
2
 The Progress/Violation Report filed by AP&P on April 5, 
1995 in an effort to extend Call's probation states that Call was 
placed on probation on April 3, 1992. R. 55; see Addendum E. The 
sentencing hearing was held on April 3, 1992. R. 39. At that 
sentencing hearing, the trial judge required Call to serve 
forthwith six months at the county jail as a condition of 
probation. R. 46. Call began serving that jail time as a 
condition of probation on April 3, 1992. R. 46. The original 
judgment is dated April 3, 1992; however, the trial judge either 
misdated the judgment or signed it several days after the hearing. 
R. 44. At any rate, AP&P acknowledged in its documents that 
probation began on April 3, 1992, and attempted to extend the 
probationary termination date to April 2, 1996. R. 55. The State 
agreed that probation began on April 3, 1992 and did not present 
any evidence or argument to the contrary. R. 204, 224, 234. 
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proceedings were not properly commenced prior to the probation 
termination date where (1) neither the State nor AP&P filed a 
violation report or any other document requesting extension in 
the trial court prior to the termination date and/or (2) Call did 
not knowingly waive his right to a hearing and counsel on the 
extension issue. 
B. CALL'S PROBATION TERMINATED AS OF APRIL 3, 
1995 WHERE NEITHER THE STATE NOR AP&P FILED A 
VIOLATION REPORT OR ANY OTHER DOCUMENT IN THE 
TRIAL COURT PRIOR TO THAT EXPIRATION DATE. 
Probation terminates by operation of law at the end of 
the probation period unless probation revocation or extension 
proceedings are properly commenced in the trial court prior to 
the termination date. See Green, 757 P.2d at 464-65 (probation 
automatically terminates at the end of the probation period) ; 
Smith, 803 P. 2d at 793 (probation automatically terminates unless 
probation revocation proceedings are properly initiated prior to 
termination date); Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1066-1071 (due process 
attaches to probation extension proceedings; probation 
automatically terminates unless probation extension proceedings 
are properly commenced prior to termination date); see discussion 
under subpoint A, supra at 10-16. 
1. Probation Extension Proceedings Must Be 
Properly Commenced in Court Prior to Termination 
of the Probation Period. 
Rawlings and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 contemplate that 
Indeed, the AP&P agent testified that Call's probation was 
scheduled to legislatively terminate April 3, 1995. R. 230. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Defendant's appeal concerns the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(West 2004), attached as Addendum, and the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which states the following: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
On December 4, 2003, defendant pled guilty to one count of theft, a third 
degree felony (R. 16-23). At the same proceeding, Judge Noel sentenced him to a 
suspended prison term of zero to five years and placed him on probation for 
eighteen months under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 66-67; 
55:14-15). Judge Noel did not sign or enter a sentencing order. At the time, 
defendant was nineteen and had no adult criminal history (R. 55:5,12-13). 
Two months later, defendant robbed Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Store at 
gunpoint (R. 27). He was caught soon thereafter, and on August 16, 2004, was 
convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm enhancements (R. 38). 
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Judge Atherton sentenced him to concurrent prison terms for the robbery 
convictions (R. 55:18-19). 
On December 6,2004, defendant appeared before Judge Reese for a probation 
revocation hearing on his theft conviction (R. 42; 55:17). Defendant admitted to 
violating his probation by robbing Dr. John's, and Judge Reese accordingly revoked 
his probation (R. 42; 55:18). Judge Reese then stated, "I guess the question is 
concurrent or consecutive" (R. 55:18). Adult Probation and Parole recommended 
that "the original order of the court be imposed to the fullest extent of the law" (R. 
55:18). Defendant argued that the sentence should run concurrent because Judge 
Atherton had imposed concurrent sentences and her sentence was after Judge 
Noel's original sentence (R. 55:19). 
Judge Reese noted that defendant's probation violation concerned "serious 
violent charges apparently involving firearms" (R. 55:19). He decided "that it 
would be just in [his] judgment to . . . run this charge consecutively with the others" 
(R. 55:19). Defendant stated, "Judge, given this is after it we would object to that 
taking place" (R. 55:19). The court said, "Pardon?" and defense counsel repeated, 
"Just for the record we would object to that" (R. 55:19). Judge Reese replied, "Okay. 
Fair enough," and the proceeding concluded (R. 55:19). 
Judge Reese signed the sentencing minutes and entered them in the record (R. 
42-43). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that order (R. 45). 
3 
concerned modifying an oral judgment before it becomes final. The question in the 
instant case is whether a court revoking a defendant's probation may run the prison 
term consecutive to a prison term for an intervening conviction. 
1. Judge Reese properly determined, for the first and only 
time, whether defendant's theft sentence would run 
concurrently or consecutively to his aggravated robbery 
sentences. 
Defendant's claim that Judge Reese increased his sentence rests, in part, on a 
false premise: that Judge Noel imposed concurrent sentencing. He did not. Judge 
Noel never stated whether defendant's theft sentence was to run concurrent or 
consecutive, because there were no other sentences with which the theft sentence 
could run concurrent or consecutive (R. 66-67; 55:1-16). At the time, defendant had 
a clean record, except for some juvenile offenses, and was not in prison or on 
probation (R. 55:12-13). 
In fact, Judge Noel had no authority to designate defendant's sentence to run 
consecutively or concurrently with any other sentence. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-401(1) (West 2004), the court imposes consecutive or concurrent sentences "if a 
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense/' In such 
cases, the court determines "if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or 
consecutively to each other" and also "if the sentences before the court are to run 
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already 
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serving/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (l)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). At defendant's 
first sentencing, he had only one felony offense: theft. Judge Noel could not 
therefore make any determination about whether the sentence would run 
concurrent or consecutive with any other sentences. 
Likewise, Judge Atherton did not, and could not, order defendant's theft 
conviction to run concurrent to his aggravated robbery convictions. When she 
sentenced defendant, he had another felony conviction, but he was not currently 
serving any time for that conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) lets the 
sentencing judge order concurrent or consecutive sentencing only with "other 
sentences the defendant is already serving/' Defendant was not serving time for his 
theft sentence, so Judge Atherton could not order his aggravated robbery sentences 
to run concurrent with his theft sentence. 
Only Judge Reese could determine consecutive or concurrent sentencing for 
defendant's aggravated robbery and theft sentences. When he reinstated 
defendant's prison term for theft, defendant was currently serving a prison term for 
aggravated robbery. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), Judge Reese had to 
determine whether defendant's theft sentence would run concurrent with or 
consecutive to his aggravated robbery sentences. As Judge Reese was the first and 
only judge to make that determination, defendant's theft sentence was not increased 
above its original term, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. 
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